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Supreme Court Nominations
Should President Clinton apply a litmus test?
As soon as election returns were in, the
speculation began over how many Supreme Court
vacancies President Bill Clinton would be able to
fill during his four-year tenure: Would he be able
to reverse the pendulum that swung the High
Court over to the right in the last 12 years?
In statements made to this magazine and
elsewhere, Clinton proclaimed his intention to
nominate justices who were committed to
"individual fights protected by our Constitution,
including the right to privacy."
All indications are that the litmus test for
judges in this administration will be the opposite of

that of the previous one: A likelihood to preserve
Roe v. Wade, rather than overturn it, will be the
new yardstick.
Nadine Strossen, president of the American
Civil Liberties Union and a professor at New York
Law School, is comfortable with that particular
test, because she believes it will result injudges
with a commitment to minority, rather than
majoritarian, interests.
Conservative commentator Bruce Fein,
however, disagrees. He warns that any casespecific litmus test is dangerous and inevitably
politicizes the judiciary.

Yes: A Solemn Duty
Their silence up until now suggests that their real quarrel is with
In the October 1992 ABA Jour- the specific nature of Clinton's judinal, Bill Clinton said he would nomi- cial "litmus test," rather than with
nate as federal judges "only men and such tests generally. Would even the
women [with] a demonstrated ... most adamant professed foe of "litcommitment to the individual rights mus tests" object, for example, to a
protected by our Constitution, in- president's commitment to nominate
cluding the right to privacy."
only judges who believed that the
By contrast, the last two admin- Court's Dred Scott decision wrongly
istrations systematically named fed- upheld slavery, or that its decision in
eral judges with narrow views about Brown rightly invalidated segregated
public schools?
individual rights in general, whoconsistent with Republican Party
platforms-opposed Roe v. Wade, Reveals Views on Rights
which recognized that the right to
Under our constitutional sysprivacy encompasses a woman's de- tem, all federal judges have substancision to have an abortion.
tial power to affect human rights.
Two justices who were appointed The Supreme Court, as the ultimate
by these presidents voted in Planned constitutional interpreter, can either
Parenthoodv. Casey to overturn Roe expand or truncate the rights of all
altogether. Three other Reagan- Americans. This power is exercised
Bush appointees bitterly disappointed by judges with lifetime tenure, submany conservatives by refusing to go ject to removal only through imquite so far. Nevertheless, their opin- peachment. Therefore, the appointion so sharply limited Roe that Chief ment of a federal judge and espeJustice Rehnquist mocked what re- cially the appointment of a Supreme
mains of that important ruling as "a Court justice-has vast consequences
mere facade."
for years to come.
Ironically, many conservatives
In light of this, presidents have
who applauded the Reagan-Bush "lit- a responsibility to nominate, and
mus test" now criticize President
senators have a responsibility to
Clinton for his pledge to name judges confirm, only women and men whom
who will respect the essential pri- they believe will uphold fundamenvacy right recognized in Roe. They tal constitutional rights.
protest that it is inappropriate to
Although all government offiseek to ascertain judicial candidates' cials swear to uphold the Constituviews on issues they might well face tion, those who are elected by majoron the bench.
ity vote often reflect majoritarian
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interests. In contrast, federal judges'
lifetime appointments insulate them
from politics and facilitate neutral
protection of all rights.
For this reason, federal courts
are uniquely situated as the guardians of individual and minority group
rights, Correspondingly, presidents
and senators have a duty to appoint
as federal judges only individuals
who will fulfill that special role.
These elected officials cannot carry
out that duty unless they are familiar with the judicial candidates' views
about the nature of that role.
Judicial candidates are, of
course, free to refuse to disclose any
of their views, or to assert that they
have not formulated definitive opinions on particular issues. But this
raises questions about the credibility
and significance of any such assertions. A candidate's denial of any
firm views on broad issues of constitutional philosophy and interpretation addressed in Roe should be far
more troubling than the denial of an
opinion on whether a specific restriction on abortion should survive constitutional muster.
Judicial powers of interpretation often are tantamount to the
power to restrict or expand the Constitution's reach. Our elected representatives should not vest such
lifelong power in any individual unless they are satisfied that it will be
exercised with respect for fundamental rights.
U

No: Don't Get Down to Cases
BY BRUCE FEIN
President Bill Clinton's casespecific Roe v. Wade litmus test for
Supreme Court nominees is worse
than President Franklin Roosevelt's
discredited court-packing scheme.
Clinton should be emulating
President Abraham Lincoln. When
he nominated Salmon P. Chase as
chief justice, the two burning constitutional issues of the day were
slavery and legal tender laws. Asked
whether his nominee would cast a
politically correct vote in such cases,
Lincoln retorted: "We cannot ask a
man what he will do, and if we
should, and he should answer us, we
should despise him for it."
Last June, the Court reaffirmed
Roe by a 5-4 margin in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey. Spurred by a
vaulting ambition worthy of Shakespeare's Macbeth, Clinton instantly
pandered to his pro-choice constituency by vowing to extort from his
Court nominees a commitment to
Roe. He voiced no reservations about
de facto coercion of Supreme Court
justices by exploiting their ambition
for appointment during the selection
process leading to nomination.
Clinton's plan to annex the judiciary as a partisan arm of the executive would subvert the legitimacy of
High Court rulings, enlightened law,
and the ability of the judiciary to
check the excesses of popular government. Even more lamentable, JusILLUSTRATION
BYTIMTEEBKEN

tice Harry Blackmun has endorsed
Clinton's benighted case-specific litmus test in his concurrence to Casey.
As Justice Felix Frankfurter
said in Offutt v. United States (1954),
"[J]ustice requires the appearance of
justice." That appearance is destroyed
ifjustices have committed their votes
in the Oval Office in particular cases
before hearing the litigants argue,
deliberating with their colleagues,
and enjoying the intellectual independence secured by life tenure. Their
votes would smack of the Queen of
Hearts' jurisprudence in "Alice's Adventures in Wonderland": "Sentence
first, verdict afterwards."
Induces Political Correctness
Without the appearance of justice, voluntary compliance with High
Court decrees is problematical. And
the rule of law would crumble if
every controversial ruling required
enforcement by bayonets A la Little
Rock, Ark., after the Court's desegregation decisions.
Clinton's promise of voting commitments would also debase the quality of decision-making. When confronted with pledging a politically
correct vote, a nominee seduced by
an ordinary amount of ambition is
unlikely to proffer intellectually pure
views. The wish becomes father to
the thought. To paraphrase Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, the lust for
judicial power "distorts the judgment," "makes what previously was

clear seem doubtful," and bends "even
well-settled principles of law."
Specific constitutional decisions
should not be warped by the uninformed and result-oriented views of
the president. That understanding
was a cornerstone in the defeat of
President Roosevelt's 1937 courtpacking scheme.
Roosevelt's maneuver was correctly perceived as lethal to the
Court's independence and its check
against majoritarian tyranny. Congress decisively rejected the measure, and the judgment of history has
condemned Roosevelt.
If Presidents Ronald Reagan
and George Bush had extracted promises from their Supreme Court nominees to overrule Roe, they would
have been properly denounced by the
media, and might properly have been
impeached by the House and convicted by the Senate. But Reagan
and Bush renounced any case-specific litmus tests, a fact corroborated
by the votes of Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy and Souter to reaffirm Roe
last June.
Presidential inquiry into the
philosophies of Supreme Court candidates is unobjectionable, even if
the responses give clues as to voting
in prospective cases. That is a timehonored practice that has not compromised judicial independence. Casespecific inquiries, in contrast, would
breach that delicate wall of separation between law and politics.
U
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